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foreclosures are similarly inadequate, since the benefits of the act extend
only to those contracts in existence prior to October 17, 1 940. Further-
more, the act fails to mention foreclosure by entry and possession and
statutory foreclosure by advertisement and sale.45 Not much is offered
in the way of protection for life insurance policy holders, since the act
doesn't apply if fifty per cent or more of the loan value of the policy
has already been borrowed. If there is fifty per cent of the loan value
left, it would generally be sufficient to carry the policy for the year
regardless of this law. The act would be beneficial to holders of new
policies because their policies' loan values would be low, but to practically
all others nothing advantageous is gained under the act. Moreover, the
act applies to a maximum of $5,000 insurance. The section on taxes
provides for deferment of real property and income taxes during the
period of military service, but personal property taxes are entirely disre-
garded. Either more adequate compensation should be paid by the
government or further protection ought to be granted. In the interest
of justice to the man in the service and of high morale in the ranks,
these shortcomings in the present act provide reason enough for the
enactment of remedial legislation. H. M. M.
PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
JOINDER OF NEGLIGENT DEFENDANTS
Plaintiff alleged in his petition that he sustained damage as a result
of injuries to his wife which she was alleged to have received through
the combined negligence of the defendants. The negligence charged
against the father, Harry Seff, was that he permitted his minor son to
operate his automobile contrary to a city ordinance of Akron. The
negligence charged against Robert Seff, a minor, was that he violated a
city ordinance in the manner in which he made a left hand turn and
also that he failed to keep a look out and to control the speed of the car.
Each of the defendants demurred to the petition on the grounds of
misjoinder of parties. Held: That the two defendants were properly
joined in the same action.1
As a general rule, a party suing in tort has the right to join or not
to join the different joint tort-feasors as parties to his action for dam-
ages.2 The reason for this is that a liability in tort is joint and several. 3
45 Under a similar provision in the Act of x918 it has been held that foreclosure by
entry and possession and statutory foreclosure by advertisement and sale were not pre-
vented by the federal law. Bell v. Buffington, 244 Mass. z94, 137 N.E. 287 (1923);
Taylor v. McGregor State Bank, 144 Minn. Z49, 174 N.W. 893 (1919), diclum..
1 Wery v. Seff, 136 Ohio St. 307, 25 N.E._(zd) 69z (1940).
2 Brownfield v. Clapham, z5 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 443, Z7 Ohio C.D. 424 (g 16).
3Lindemann v. Eyrich, 2! Ohio App. 314, 153 N.E. 2z (1926).
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A difficult problem is whether two or more parties whose negligent acts
concur in causing a single injury to the plaintiff may be classed as joint
tort-feasors for the purpose of uniting them as defendants in one action.
Many courts have refused to permit joinder because the duty which
was owed by one defendant to the plaintiff was not the same as the duty
owed by the other defendant or defendants. Thus it was held in the
case of Ailorris v. 'Voodburn4 that a municipality and a lot owner were
not jointly liable to the plaintiff for the duty owed by the municipality
to the plaintiff was different from that owed by the lot owner. The
more recent case of Bello v. City of Cleveland' laid down a rule similar
to that of the Mor-is case. Joinder was not permitted in the Belo case
for the duty of one defendant was statutory and that of the other
defendant was a common law duty. The court reasoned that the
different types of duty would involve different matters of fact and of
law. The defendants in the principal case owed the plaintiff a similar
duty but there is dicta to the effect that it isn't necessary that the
defendants owe a common duty to the plaintiff.
In many of those cases in which the courts deny joinder because
there is not a common duty, the courts could as easily put their decisions
on the grounds that the liablity of one defendant is primary while that
of the other defendant is secondary. A party who is secondarily liable
is liable because of his relationship to the wrongdoer. Such tort-feasors
are known as related tort-feasors and not joint tort-feasors. Where a
primary and secondary liability exist, there can be no joinder for there
is not joint accountability, because if recovery is had against the party
secondarily liable he may recover from the defendant who is primarily
liable. A master whose liability is predicated on the doctrine of respondeat
superior cannot be joined in Ohio with his servant for the master is only
secondarily liable.' A plaintiff might avoid the sustaining of a demurrer
to his petition if he alleges that the master participated in the act which
constituted the wrong. A negligent retailer of foodstuffs cannot be
joined with the negligent wholesaler for the wholesaler is primarily
liable and the retailer is only secondarily so.' There was only primary
liability in the principal case for the father was liable for his own negli-
gent act and not because of his relationship to the other wrongdoer,
his son.
Numerous courts in refusing to permit joinder of negligent defend-
'Morris v. Woodburn, 57 Ohio St. 330, 48 N.E. 1097 (IS97).
'Bello v. City of Cleveland, xo6 Ohio St. 94, 138 N.E. S26 (x92z).
' Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 18 3, sS7, 24 N.E. (2d) 705, 707 (1938).
7 Canton Provision Co. v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, z96 N.E. 634 (1935); Kniess v.
Armour & Co., 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E. (2d) 734 (1938).
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ants have given among their reasons the fact that there is an absence
of concert of action between the defendants. Dicta in Stark County
Agricultural Society v. Brenner will serve to illustrate this point. There
it was stated that, "There is joint liability only where there is concert
of action and a common intent and enterprise." ' On this point the
Court of Appeals for Franklin county observed that it was appropriate
to speak of concert of action and common purpose in torts wherein
volition or purpose is one of the essentials, but volition or purpose is
not an essential of negligence.9 It is submitted that it would be less
confusing if the courts, in refusing to permit joinder of negligent
defendants, did not give as one of their reasons the absence of concert
of action.
There is also some authority in Ohio to the effect that the same
degree of negligence must be charged against each defendant in order
to join them. Thus, in the recent case of Smith v. Fisher10 it was held
to be a misjoinder where one defendant was charged with wanton
negligence and the other defendant with ordinary negligence. The
court in that case reasoned that the two degrees of negligence would
involve different issues of fact and of law. The instant case, while not
passing on that point, takes a liberal view of joinder which makes it
doubtful whether the Smidth case would be considered good authority
today.
The principal case goes a long way in solving some of the diffi-
culties of joint liability in Ohio and in removing some of the confusion
which has heretofore existed by now holding that two or more persons
may be joined as defendants under circumstances creating primary
accountability, directly producing a single, indivisible injury by their
concurrent negligence, even though there is no common duty, common
design or concerted action. It is apparent that the plaintiff should be
permitted to do this in order to avoid multiplicity of suits.
R. L. R.
aStark County Agricultural Society v. Brenner, izz Ohio St. 56o, 573, 172 N.E.
659, 664 (930).
' Dash v. Fairbanks Morse & Co., 49 Ohio App. 57, 195 N.E. 413 (1934).
10 i5 Ohio Op. 325 (1939).
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